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never heard the revelation of God's will, would have blushed to write a sentence from which such an inference could, by any possibility, be drawn. The law of the Jews was, "He that curseth his father or mother dying let him die, he hath cursed his father and mother, let his blood be upon him."—Lev. xx. 9. Death was the punishment of a child who cursed his father or mother, whether present or absent. "He that striketh his father or mother shall be put to death."—Exodus xxi. 15. The little book says it is a *grievous* sin, whereas it is a mortal sin to talk during mass or to get drunk.

Next we come to the 5th Commandment—"Thou shalt not kill." Murder, or the unjustly taking away another's life, is a grievous mortal sin. This is all very good; but a foot note tells us "it is not a sin to desire some temporal misfortune to another, because it will make him *cease to give scandal, or be converted, or not persecute the good.*"—p. 16. That is, if a Roman Catholic, convinced of what he conceives to be error, should begin to avow his change of feeling, and thereby give scandal to the Church, it is no possible harm to wish him a smart attack of paralysis, or a gentle breaking of his neck, or other temporal misfortune, because it makes him cease to give scandal. Though it may do his body some harm, it will do his soul some good. The Holy Inquisition believed this doctrine as sincerely as does the Redemptorist Father; and if it has developed its principles into practice more extensively than the Redemptorist Father, the reader may depend upon it it is solely because the constitutions of Italy and Spain are more agreeable to mutilation and murder, that scandal may be hushed, than the free constitution of the Anglo-Saxon. They may burn our Bibles, but they cannot burn our bodies. But the fell spirit of the Inquisition—the spirit that lit the fires of Smithfield, and still feeds the dungeons of Tuscany and Rome with their victims—that spirit of religious persecution is disclosed unmistakably in those few but pregnant words—"It is no sin to desire some temporal misfortune to another, because it will make him cease to give scandal or be converted."

Upon the 6th Commandment—"Thou shalt not commit adultery"—there are many things to which we should make grave exception. This portion of the book is full of gross and indecent suggestions, of impure and abominable ideas respecting the nearest and most sacred relations of life, from childhood to manhood. The very nature of the subject compels us to pass them over in silent reprobation.

We can more freely examine the exposition of the 7th Commandment—"Thou shalt not steal." Upon this very plain and simple text the rev. father revels in the luxury of casuistical refinement and subtlety. He says there are different ways of stealing:—1. To steal all at once. 2. To take and keep things by little and little. 3. To help others to steal, and so on. Then, as to the sin which attaches to the different kinds of stealing as distinguished by him, he says, "It is a venial sin to steal a little. It is a mortal sin to steal much; for example, to steal from a workman a day's wages, or to steal less from a poorer man, or more from a richer man."—p. 20. Now, reader, are not these most ingenious and most unsatisfactory distinctions from an infallible authority? If you steal 4s. 6d. from a carpenter, being his day's wages, that's a mortal sin; but if you steal the same sum from his employer, the builder, it is transformed into a venial sin, and requires to be repeated three times, at least, to reach the size and magnitude of a mortal sin in his behalf. The common law of England had once a distinction between grand and petit larceny. It was a petit larceny if the sum stolen was under twelve pence, and a grand larceny if it exceeded the little shilling. The plain sense of modern times would not endure such preposterous distinctions, which measured crime by the amount of its success, and not by the spirit which actuates its perpetration. But this is not the worst of it. The Rev. Mr. Furniss tells us, "If you steal from different persons, it needs *half as much again for a mortal sin*; and the same if you steal at different times. If you steal from different persons, as well as at different times, it needs *double the sum*. If you steal often a little, when the little sums come to make altogether a large sum, then it becomes a mortal sin. It is also a mortal sin to steal a little, if at the same time you have the will and intention to steal much, if you could."—p. 20.

Can any honest man read this with patience? If we dared to measure these matters by degrees, by a *sin-measure*, who can believe that it is a greater sin once and for ever, under strong overpowering temptation, to appropriate, or, in plain English, to steal a round sum of say £100 on a single occasion, than to draw the same sum from a till stealthily, but continuously, with fixed and steadfast purpose, day after day, for a hundred days, by sums of 20s. each day. The criminality of each individual act is the same before God—the motive is the same, and the breach of trust by which it is accomplished the same; and does not the deliberate systematic repetition of the act one hundred times, until it becomes a habit of the mind and an established principle of action, aggravate the guilt a thousand fold? Not so, says the infallible Church, teaching morality as Christians—which would be indignantly repudiated by the most reputable members of the most reputable order. For may repeat the act of theft 100 times, at the rate

of £1 per day, before it becomes equivalent in guilt to the single act of stealing £100 all at once. By a still more complex feat of Romish arithmetic it is declared that if, instead of always plundering the same individual, the dexterous thief distributes his attentions among several, he may practise his art to a much wider limit before he incurs the mortal sin. He may plunder 199 persons of one pound each before he incurs the same guilt as if he robbed one person of £100. What apprentice or clerk in a grocer's shop, desiring to appropriate as much of his master's property as he could safely manage, would do otherwise than adopt Mr. Furniss's plan of taking little by little, and thereby keeping his poor soul safe from mortal sin. Now, what is the secret spring of all this kind of theology? The confessional and the sale of indulgences are vastly prejudiced by big sins done *in globo*; that is done all at once. There is at best but one confession of them, and most probably none at all, as the risk of detection seals the lips; but let the thief subdivide his crime into many small acts, constantly repeated, no matter how it sears his conscience till it has lost all sense of sin and of honesty, it is more venial in the sight of the Church of Rome than one bold act of crime which endangered her privilege of remission? Would not the following be a curious thesis for the class of dogmatic theology at Maynooth to discuss. Assuming that an adult person may be killed by a single grain of strichnine administered in one dose, and that the act of administering it amounts to a mortal sin: how often may it be administered "little by little," in portions of 1-10th of a grain to the same patient, before it amounts to a mortal sin? And again—to how many different patients may the same quantity be administered at different times before the mortal sin is fully consummated. Does not such monstrous jargon about venial and mortal sins sicken the heart of an honest man? Could it have even entered into the imagination to conceive such a distinction, unless a man had a pecuniary interest in the remission of sins, and, therefore, was obliged to set a mercantile value upon their enormity?

Another specimen of the kind of honesty inculcated, we read as follows, p. 21:—"When materials are given for some work; for example—cloth to tailors, it is a sin to keep pieces which remain, except people are quite sure that it is not against the will of the employer, or there is a common custom of doing it, or it is necessary in order to gain reasonable profit! [No wonder that Roman Catholic tailors and dress-makers would indulge in the game of cribbage.] It is a sin to mix something with what you sell—for example, water with any liquor, except there is a common custom of doing it, and it is necessary in order to gain a reasonable profit. [No wonder our beer is mixed with water, our milk with chalk, our butter with flour, our gold chains with brass, our very medicines with vile and noxious stuffs.] Again, to forge or imitate a person's writing, if you do any harm with it, is a sin—p. 21. The converse of this proposition is left to the fancy. To forge or imitate a person's writing, if you do some good with it, is not a sin. If, suppose, a forged document purports to come from a parent, commanding obedience to something which the Church desires to have done—to take the veil of a nun—the vow of poverty and celibacy—to transfer property, or the like—it is, after all, but a pious fraud, and does some good, or, at least, is intended to do good. All this is necessarily right. How can fair discussion in matters of controversy be carried on with adversaries who hold such doctrines? If it be permitted to forge or imitate a person's handwriting, it can be little harm to alter a passage in St. Augustine or St. Jerome, so as to fit an argument and discomfit a troublesome opponent. The chances are, if he be not very sharp he never may look to the original, and the fraud will pass undiscovered, and the good! cause will be served. Here is the source of many a fraud and fabrication exposed in the pages of the CATHOLIC LAYMAN, and hence it is that, expose and confute them as often as we may, they spring up afresh in perennial streams of untailing abundance.

Having said so much of stealing, let us see how the duty of restitution is handled. "If you have stolen anything you must give it back; if you have injured any one in his person, character, honour, or goods, you must make amends." Very good, so far.—"You may delay restitution if you cannot do it at present, without very great difficulty; for example, if a workman would have to sell his tools, or if a person would lose his character—but you must have the will and intention to do it as soon as possible, at least by little and little."—p. 22.

So, when a man has robbed his fellow of his property, and consults the Church of Rome as to his duty of restitution, he is told to consult his own convenience first, and not the circumstances of the injured man, or the imperative demands of justice. He is not, at once, promptly and at any cost and any inconvenience to restore what he has stolen to his victim, who may be driven to the last extremity of want by its deprivation. The workman is not to sell his tools, much less his coat, to do instant justice, when the moment of compunction for his fault has arrived, as this would place him in some difficulty, and he may take his time and give it back little by little, as suits his convenience. Still more abominable is the case of a man who has injured the character of his neighbour by some wicked, calumny, or blighted the honour and fair fame of a woman by some unfounded slander. What is his plain duty? Honestly and openly to confess his fault, and thereby make the only repara-

tion in his power. This he cannot do without in some degree compromising his own character. What matter for that! whose fault is it? Go at once and make instant and ample reparation, and clear the slandered character, wipe away the aspersion which cannot rest for a moment upon a woman's honour without diminishing its lustre. No, no, says the cold-blooded disciple of Liguiri, you are not required to compromise your own character at all. Let injured innocence remain under the damning imputation of your vile slander; let your victim sink steadily into an infamous grave, while you recal your slander by little and little—by gentle hints and slight insinuations, by saying, "Well, perhaps, I was too censorious; perhaps I took an uncharitable, a hasty view of her conduct." This is no supposition of ours. Hear Mr. Furniss himself:—"If you injure much or take away any one's character by a lie, it is a mortal sin, and you must recal the lie. You might say you were mistaken or the like."—p. 23.

After this—our readers will not be taken by surprise at anything to be found in this little book on the subject of lies. It says, "Lies are always sins; but it is not a lie for a servant to say that her master is not at home, meaning that he cannot be seen, because every one understands this. Lies which do great harm are mortal sins."—p. 22. Where else but in a code of morality such as this will one find the test of a lie to consist in its consequences, instead of its intention to deceive. Whether the servant does deceive the visitor or not, is not the test of its being a lie; it is whether it was uttered with the intention of deceiving. What is a lie? The breach of the moral and religious obligation under which we are bound to speak the truth. What is truth? The correspondence between the utterance of the tongue and the sentiment of the heart; the faithful conformity of our language, or of our conduct, to the sentiment of the mind we declare. The devil is called the father of lies, and the first lie recorded in Scripture was uttered by him. Mr. Furniss, adopting the language of his Church, says that lies which do great harm are mortal sins; and, of course, lies which do little harm are not mortal sins. What says the Douay Bible, Apoc. xxi. v. 8, "All liars shall have their portion in the pool burning with fire and brimstone." Again, "Telling a secret is wrong, and is very bad if it is a great secret, and telling it does great harm, or gives great sorrow. It would not be wrong to tell it to some one for a good reason, such as to ask advice." (p. 23.) Therefore, of course, it is always right to tell every secret to the priest, and he must be the depository of a great many things told under the seal of the strictest confidence and assurance that the confidant would be silent as the grave. What sense of security can there exist in the presence of such morality as this? Again, "To read letters or private papers is wrong, and would be very bad if you think, perhaps, there is something in them the owner would be very sorry for you to know." (p. 24.) This, which is very wrong, and something worse in the estimation of every honourable mind, becomes very right, provided the inquisitive delinquent plunges into the midst of the perusal of the forbidden letter without thinking anything at all of what the owner would feel if he saw his privacy invaded, and his inmost secrets reft from him!

Here we must close, and ask each of our readers is the teaching of this book in accordance with his notions of "what every Christian should do? Is there any master who would employ a servant; any labourer who would associate with his neighbour, if he practised what a Redemptorist Father has preached? The teaching of this little book—small in size, but big in mischief—is to be substituted for the teaching of the Bible. Can we, then, wonder that in order to accomplish this monstrous substitution, it is found necessary to banish and to burn a book which condemns every line of their teaching, and convicts them of falsehood and dishonesty to the souls of their deluded followers. In regard to the passages we have noticed it is not necessary to cite Scripture to condemn them. We appeal to the honest sentiments of our readers' own minds—to the native impulses of their hearts—to the sober judgments of their plain understandings—to condemn such teaching as not merely unchristian, but immoral and abominable.

THE INVOCATION OF SAINTS.

"This is eternal life," said our blessed Lord, "that they might know Thee, the only true God, and Jesus Christ, whom Thou hast sent." This life-giving knowledge of God is something more than a mere apprehension of His being and attributes by the understanding. It denotes a personal, practical acquaintance with Him in our souls, which is to be carried on from day to day, and deepened and consolidated by obedience to His revealed will. Yet this intellectual perception of Him is preliminary to, and forms an important part in, that higher, deeper, and holier knowledge which our Lord denominates eternal life. To know God requires that we have just notions of His character and our relations to Him. We cannot be said to know Him while we entertain erroneous ideas on these points. Accordingly, the design of revealed religion is to enlighten us in this respect, and to set before us these all-important matters in a clear, simple, and intelligible form. To the holy Scriptures, therefore, which are the revelation of God's will, we must

refer for instruction as to the relation in which we stand with regard to the Divine Being.

Of the metaphysical nature of the Deity we know nothing, and, constituted as we are, we can know nothing. Our limited capacities and dull intellectual powers fail to grasp the mighty idea of God, or to comprehend what He is intrinsically in His infinite and glorious essence. He is also so far removed from us by the dignity of His Godhead that we can have no direct or immediate communication with Him: all the knowledge of Him which we can attain, and all the communication we can have with Him, must be in and through the person of a Mediator—some Being who may be the channel of communication between the Deity and mankind. Such is Christ, in whom, and through whom alone, we can know God, or have any communication with Him: hence He said, "To know Thee, the only true God, and Jesus Christ, whom Thou hast sent." On another occasion, He affirmed, "No man knoweth the Father, save the Son, and he to whomsoever the Son will reveal Him:" so that all intercourse between God and man must be by means of the mediation of Christ. On this account He is called the "One Mediator of God and man" (1 Tim., ii. 5). This, His mediatorial office, is described in Scripture under different aspects.

In the Old Testament He is designated as the **דָּבָר** *Davar*, or Word of God. The ideal meaning of this word **דָּבָר** *Davar*, is putting forth, either in a good or a bad sense. The *Davar*, or Word of God, is the personal expression of the Divine Being—the coming out, as it were, of God from the unfathomable depths of His Deity, to make known His will to man. A word, also, is the sign of an idea: by words we interchange thoughts, and make known our feelings and notions to one another. So Christ is the Word of God: He by whom God has declared His will to men, and by whom all communication is to be obtained. In the same sense, St. Paul calls Him the "image of the Invisible God," and "the character of His person." In the Book of Daniel, we find the Chaldeans, who held the emanation system, speaking of this same Being as "*the Son of God*," which title is used very frequently in the New Testament as descriptive of the mediatorial office of Jesus Christ. This we conceive to be the import of the term in general; for that the design of Holy Scripture is not to propound to us subtle and abstruse theories concerning the nature of the Godhead, but to inform us as to our relation to that God. When the Second Person of the Blessed Trinity is denominated "the Son of God," that describes not so much His relation to the Father as His relation to us, and our relation, through Him, to the Deity. It represents Him whom we, for distinction, call "God the Son," as proceeding forth from the immensity of His divine existence to manifest Himself to mankind. As John the Baptist said, "No man hath seen God at any time. The only begotten Son, which is in the bosom of the Father, He hath declared Him." [*ἐξηγήσατο*].

This Son, or Word, is also spoken of as the Angel or Messenger of the Lord, or, as the Hebrew may also be rendered, "the Angel of the Lord." We generally understand the word angel as denoting one of those happy spirits that serve God in Heaven, and do His errands throughout creation; but very frequently in the Old Testament "the Angel of the Lord" is none other than the Divine Being Himself—the *Davar*, or personal "Word" of God. A very remarkable instance of this is in the third chapter of Exodus, where, at the third verse, we read, "And the Angel of the Lord appeared unto him (Moses), in a flame of fire, out of a bush." This Angel is called God (**אֱלֹהִים** *Elohim*), and Lord (**יְהוָה** *Yehovah*), at verse 4; the God of Abraham, the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob, in verse 6; and finally reveals Himself in verse 14, as the **אֱלֹהִים** (*Eloheh*), or I AM—the incomprehensible, self-existent, immutable, and eternal God.

From these few scant remarks, it appears that, in the preceding ages of the Church, the Second Person of the Trinity performed the office of Mediator between God and man. But it was not until His first advent that He assumed His mediatorial office in its fullness; and it was not till the publication of the Christian religion that mankind were fully instructed as to their Mediator and His official character. He who in the Old Testament was revealed as the **דָּבָר** (*Davar*) or Divine Word—the Deity coming forth from the profundities of His ineffable Being, to instruct mankind as to His truth—is in the New Testament proposed as the *Λόγος* (*Logos*), the Eternal Word or Wisdom, "manifest in the flesh," and bringing out in all their fullness the divine verities mystically represented and darkly hinted in preceding times. He is distinctly set forth as the only One by whom we can have acceptance with God, as He who, by His vicarious death, procured salvation for the lost race of men, and now pleads its availing merit at the right hand of the Majesty in the Heavens. In this, His intercession, He stands alone. None can be conjoined with Him in the discharge of His mediatorial office. St. Paul asserts, in the same terms, the unity of the Godhead and the unity of the Mediator of God and men. "There is but one God," writes he to Timothy, "and one Mediator of God and men—the man, Christ Jesus." So that if we may say there are more Mediators than one, we may also say that there are more

Gods than one. So express and plain are the statements of Holy Scripture on the subject, that no one calling himself a Christian has ventured openly to deny it; nevertheless, the Church of Rome complicates and misrepresents the whole matter, and does virtually and practically set up other mediators between God and men, in her Invocation of Saints.

There is no subject, we think, in the whole range of the Romish controversy about which there has been more misunderstanding, or in which more random assertions have been resorted to, or more obstinacy displayed on both sides of the question, than in this one of the Invocation of Saints. We will endeavour to avoid these, and be as honest and impartial as we can. We shall take the Roman Catholic doctrine on its own grounds, address ourselves to the real question, and avoid all distortion, misrepresentation, or mystification of it.

The Creed of Pope Pius the Fourth asserts "that the Saints, reigning together with Christ, are to be honoured and invoked, and that they offer prayers to God for us, and that their relics are to be held in veneration." If we may be allowed the exercise of private judgment on this clause of the Creed, our interpretation would be, that no saint is to be honoured or invoked, since no saint is now reigning with Christ. The Council of Trent, Session XXV., says that "those men hold impious sentiments who deny that the saints who enjoy eternal happiness in Heaven are to be invoked, or who affirm that to invoke them to pray for us, even each individually, is idolatry, or that it is contrary to the Word of God, or opposed to the honour of Jesus Christ, the one Mediator between God and man, to supplicate, verbally or mentally, those who reign in Heaven." The Trent Fathers are unusually moderate in this matter; their decree even borders on ambiguity—at least, it is capable of very wide interpretation. If by "those who reign in Heaven" be meant the Blessed Trinity, for the Persons of the Godhead alone do reign in Heaven, we will most heartily agree with the Council; but if they mean *dead men*, we entirely dissent from them. As to "the saints who enjoy eternal happiness in Heaven," and of whom it is impious to say they do not pray for us, we believe there are no such persons, and we, therefore, do not hold impious sentiments concerning them. We believe that all Christ's faithful people possess eternal life, even on earth; that they enjoy it more fully when they depart this world; that they are then "in joy and felicity;" that they are "with Christ," in a higher sense than when on earth; but we do not believe that they are in a state of eternal happiness, for God's Word says no such thing. The Scripture does not afford much to satisfy a curious mind with respect to the state of separate spirits; it only asserts in general terms the happiness of true believers. But if anything at all appear from its statements on the subject, it is that they are not now reigning with Christ, nor enjoying that measure of full and everlasting blessedness which will be their portion after the Resurrection. Of the passages referred to in the *Index Biblicus* attached to most editions of the Vulgate, as proving that saints are now reigning with Christ, the only one which at all bears upon the subject is Apoc. iii. 21:—"To him that overcometh will I give to sit in My throne, as I also overcame, and sat down with My Father in His throne." This passage is entirely opposed to the Romish view of the matter. In it Christ speaks as sitting down in His Father's throne, and represents His own throne as a thing different, on which He that overcomes shall hereafter sit with Him. He shall not sit on His own throne till He come to judgment. As He Himself said, "When the Son of Man shall come in His glory, and all His holy angels with Him, then shall He sit on the throne of His glory; then shall the King say to them on His right hand—Come ye blessed of My Father, inherit the Kingdom prepared for you from the foundation of the world." Like the nobleman in the parable, He has gone to prepare a kingdom and to return, and, when having prepared it, He shall return, then shall He sit on His royal seat, and His saints shall reign with Him. So He said to His disciples—"Ye which have followed me, in the regeneration, when the Son of Man shall sit on the throne of His glory, ye also shall sit on twelve thrones, judging the twelve tribes of Israel." Plainly, this refers to something future; for Christ has not yet assumed His kingly throne, nor do His Apostles judge—that is, rule—the twelve tribes of Israel. The people of Jesus shall hereafter reign with Him, but they are not now reigning with Him. He is not even Himself reigning now. He, of course, reigns as God, and so He has done from all eternity; but as the Messiah, the anointed King of God's people, who shall rule on the throne of David and on the Hill of Zion, He does not reign.—His kingdom is yet future; and we daily pray for its glorious advent—"Thy Kingdom come."

It may seem beside the question to inquire as to whether the saints reign with Christ; but it is plain that the whole meaning of the decree of the Council of Trent and of the passage in Pope Pius's Creed, with reference to invoking the saints, depends upon it; and it seems, besides, to be alleged as a sort of reason for that practice. Let us address ourselves, however, to the main question, which is, whether saints, after their departure from this life, are to be invoked by us.

The popular notion among Roman Catholics is that

the saints intercede with Christ to intercede with God for us. And this is in perfect accordance with the Council of Trent, which says:—"It is good and useful suppliantly to invoke them, and to have recourse to their prayers, help, and assistance, to obtain favours from God, through Jesus Christ our Lord," &c. In this light we shall consider the matter. Viewed simply thus, the invocation of saints is no infringement on the intercessorial office of Christ; nor do we object to it on that ground, but on the ground that it alters the relation in which a sinner stands with respect to God. It, indeed, leaves Jesus in His mediatorial dignity, but it imposes other mediators between Him and us. It makes Jesus a mediator between God and the saints, and the saints between Christ and us; and thus it alters our relation to Him, and represents it in a different light from that in which it is set forth in Holy Scripture, where He is proposed as the one Mediator—not between God and the saints, nor between God and the angels, but—between God and men. Besides, in no part of Scripture are saints represented as holding an intermediate office between Christ and His people on earth. Thus it is that the Roman Catholic doctrine, even in its mildest form, misrepresents our relation towards Christ and God the Father.

The use of a Mediator is to reconcile parties who had been previously at variance, or to establish a communication between such as had no natural connection. God and man had been separated, not only by that immeasurable chasm which severs the Divine Being from all creatures whatever, but also by the enmity which sin had occasioned. Christ, by uniting in His own person the natures of God and man, established a connection and means of communication between them; and, by His death, atoned for human transgression, and procured merit on the behalf of fallen man, which, being appropriated to him, renders him accepted in the sight of the Divine justice. Thus Jesus fulfils the duties of a Mediator. He is a daysman, who can lay His hand on God and man, combining in his own person the natures of both, and effecting a reconciliation, and becoming the means of inter-communication between them. But the same reasons which show the necessity of such a Mediator as Christ between God and man do not and cannot hold, so as to require other mediators between Christ and us. There is not between His human nature and us that immeasurable distance of being, demanding a mediator to serve as a channel of communication; for His nature as we are, only being more thoroughly and perfectly such. Nor does there now exist between Him and us that enmity, on account of sin, which made His propitiation necessary; for He came to take away that enmity, and has effectually done so. He needs none to propitiate Him on our behalf; for He Himself is the propitiation for our sins. Besides, if there be any such enmity, saints or angels cannot remove it, unless, indeed, they become mediators of atonement, which Roman Catholics will not allow; for the note in the common editions of the Douay Bible, on 1 Tim., ii. 5, says, "Christ is the one and only Mediator of Redemption." Further, if Jesus really accomplished the work He came to perform, in fully propitiating His Divine Father, and establishing an amicable connection between Him and us mortals, then it must be superfluous—nay, it must be superlative impiety—to conjure others with Him in His glorious work, or to suppose that He Himself requires to be atoned, who wrought out the atonement for us with His blood. If He requires other mediators to interpose between Him and us, then He cannot be a good mediator, or it were just as well if He had not at all undertaken His office of mediation; for an intercessor who requires others to plead with him, is in reality no intercessor, or a very curious one, since it is as hard to deal with him as with the person whom he has undertaken to propitiate. Thus we see that the Invocation of Saints is to be derogatory of the glory of the Mediator Christ, and that it causes the sinner to misunderstand the mode of access to God which the Divine wisdom has appointed.

While Holy Scripture is clear and express in its statements concerning the mediation and intercession of Christ; while there are in the Bible many promises to those who avail themselves of His intercession, and examples of those who did so; there is not in the whole range of the inspired Word, the remotest hint that dead saints intercede for us, nor any worthy example of persons seeking their intercession; neither is there any promise that prayers to them or through them will meet with a favourable acceptance. No wonder, then, that Dr. Milner should say that the Invocation of Saints is "not clearly contained in Scripture." A controversialist, Milner was not remarkable for candour; and in this case he had not the honesty to avow what he evidently felt—to wit, that this practice is not set forth in Scripture. And it is observable that in his letter on the Invocation of Saints, which forms letter xxxiii. in his "End of Controversy," he does not adduce a single text of Scripture in support of it, but contents himself with refuting charges of idolatry against his Church. He tries, indeed, to confound the matter with the worship of angels—the usual trick of Romanists in this controversy—and the absurdity which Protestants have not been sufficiently on their guard. Roman Catholics find little or nothing in Scrip-

to support their invocation of saints, and they are glad to confound it with angel worship, in order that they may be able to put forth something like a formidable array of testimony and argument, as in military tactics it is often desirable to effect a union of forces when separately they would not be able to withstand the shock of the enemy. We will, however, take the Invocation of Saints on its own ground.

In order to prove the lawfulness of invoking saints, Romanists quote such passages as Exodus, xxxii., 11-14; 1 Kings, vii., 8-10; Job, xlii., 7-8; Romans, xv., 30; Ephesians, vi., 18-19; 1 Thes., v., 25; Heb., viii., 12; James, v., 16. These passages have nothing at all to do with the present question. They simply inculcate a duty which all true Christians acknowledge—namely, that they should pray for each other. They speak of the living praying for one another, but nothing to show that it is right to seek the prayers of the dead, which is the point in dispute. From these passages it is clearly shown that the living should pray for, and solicit the prayers of, their fellow-Christians; and we may justly say that, if it were right to request the prayers of the departed—"those who reign in Heaven," as the Council of Trent says—that duty would be pointed out with, at least, equal distinctness and decision. There is a vast difference between soliciting the prayers of the living and those of the dead—in fact, all the imaginable difference that can be between any two things. A living person can hear when he is asked to pray on behalf of another, or, if the parties be at a distance, the request may be made known by messenger or by letter; whereas, in the case of those who are dead and gone to Heaven, we have no assurance that they are at all acquainted with the events of this world, nor do we know any communication they can have with it. Before a Roman Catholic, then, can take any advantage from the texts of Scripture which speak of intercession of the living, so as to refer them to the dead, he must prove that departed spirits know when we call on them to pray for us, and then that they are able to intercede on our behalf, as we request. We will just consider these two points.

As to the amount of knowledge possessed by saints in their disembodied state, we know little. The Word of God says nothing definite about it; and we must leave this matter as He has left it—unknown and unexplained. It is, however, plainly stated that of themselves they know nothing. Job says of the dead man:—"His sons come to honour, and he knoweth it not; they are brought low, but he perceiveth it not of them."—Job, xiv. 12.

The prophet Isaiah, addressing God, says, "Surely, thou art our Father, because (O kee) Abraham is ignorant of us, and Isaac does not recognize us: thou, O Lord, art our Father, and our Redeemer." Isa. lxiii. 16. The wise king Solomon also distinctly affirms "the dead know not anything, neither is to them any more for ever any part (or interest) at all in anything that is done under the sun." Eccles. ix. 5, 6. It is to be regretted that our English version is ambiguous in the passage in Isaiah; and in that from Ecclesiastes falls very far short of the force of the original.

On this last passage is the following note in the Douay Bible, which is well worthy of attention:—"Know nothing more," &c., viz.—"As to the transactions of this world, in which they have now no part, unless it be revealed to them; neither have they any knowledge or power now of doing anything to secure their eternal state, if they have not taken care of it in their life time; nor can they procure to themselves any good, as the living always may do by the grace of God."

This note is entirely alien from the meaning of the text, which is as strong as language can be in asserting that the dead have no knowledge or interest whatever in the affairs of this life. But be the respective meanings of the text and the note what they may, it is plain enough from both that an immense difference exists between the state of knowledge of the living and the dead. The living know what takes place around them in this world; the dead know nothing about it, unless it be revealed to them. BUT IS IT REVEALED TO THEM? This is the important question. When a Romanist cries out, "St. Barnabas, pray for us!" he is assured by the note in his Bible that St. Barnabas does not hear him, nor know anything about him, "unless it be revealed to him." But who can tell that it is revealed to Barnabas that such an one is requesting his intercession? The Roman Catholic must take this for granted; but that is to take the whole matter for granted. It is to pray at random, to talk into the air, without any assurance that his words will be regarded: such procedure is absurd in the extreme. For aught he knows, St. Barnabas may be otherwise engaged at the time he is praying to him; or there may be, just then, so many applications to him for his prayers, that he may be unable to attend to them all, even supposing it should be revealed to him: so that difficulties attend every step. Then, again, how does the saint know whether the prayers offered him proceed from formality, from folly, or from downright wickedness? He must know all about his petitioner—perhaps *client* would be a better term—before he can tell whether he ought or ought not to supplicate God on his behalf. Has all this been revealed to him? If the prayer be offered *mentally*, the saint must know of all that passes in the hearts of his clients. Has this been revealed to him? How can the Romanist know that the saints are aware of all or any of the invocations sent up to them, at the same time, from various and most

distant parts of the world, by various persons, for various purposes, with various motives, and with various dispositions of religious feeling? How can he tell that the saints are able to distinguish these their various petitioners, their characters, their circumstances, their motives, and the objects of their prayers? He is taught in his Douay Bible that the saints have in themselves no knowledge of any of these things; and who is to inform him that they have been revealed to them? If these matters be revealed to the saints, it must be by God himself; but what can be more absurd than to suppose the Almighty constantly engaged in telling all the saints about all the myriads of people who may be calling on them for their intercession? Such a notion is scarcely less impious than it is ridiculous. It makes God a mediator between the saints and men, rather than the saints intercessors with Him for men. Then what a roundabout way the Romanist has to go, in order to present his petitions to God. He says he is afraid to approach Christ, on account of his sins; so he turns to the saints, and his prayer goes first to God, then to the saints, then to Jesus Christ, and then back again to God. Far better it is to go to Christ, as He himself invites us to do, than to be driving about to saints and angels, of whom we do not know that any of them has the most remote knowledge of our necessities, or even of our existence. We do not say that God may not reveal to them whatever may seem fit to Him; but we do most distinctly assert that no Roman Catholic can have any proof that when he calls on a dead saint to pray for him, the said saint knows anything about his prayers or himself. Thus, the whole matter is utter uncertainty on the part of the Romanist.

We now advance to the next point, which is, to inquire whether the saints departed do pray for their militant brethren on earth. What we, Protestants, say is, that no one can tell how, or in what manner, the disembodied spirits are occupied: we can have no idea of any employment that can suit them, so different is their condition from any with which we are acquainted. We cannot, of course, tell whether they may or may not pray; we cannot conceive as to how they can pray; nevertheless, if God's word will inform us that they do pray, we are to believe it without hesitation. But that word says nothing about it, and, therefore, we are not authorised to affirm anything in the matter. If the accounts of the visions in the book of Revelations be descriptions of heaven as it is at present, they seem to indicate that the happy spirits are occupied in praise rather than in prayer.

To prove that dead saints do pray for us, Jer. xv. 1 is quoted, which thus reads in the Authorised Version:—"Though Moses and Samuel stood before me," &c. In the Douay Bible it is more correctly rendered, "If Moses and Samuel shall stand." &c. ("Si steterint." Vulgate. The Hebrew particle (אם) means "if," and is not so well rendered "though," which is ambiguous. Our English Version may be taken to mean that Moses and Samuel *did* stand before God on behalf of Israel; but this is not the meaning of the Prophet, who merely supposes a possibility that these worthies might stand before the Lord, or, rather, he speaks *hypothetically*, and declares, that even their intercession, if that were resorted to, would be unavailing. This, then, is no proof that departed saints do pray for us.

2nd Machabees, xv. 14, is also quoted, where Jeremias the Prophet, who was dead, is said "to pray much for the people and the city of God." But we deny the canonicity and inspiration of these books of Maccabees, which cuts short all further remarks, as it is not our intention here to discuss the canon of Scripture.

The next passage adduced in proof that dead saints pray for us is Apoc. v. 8. "The four living creatures, and the four-and-twenty elders, fell down before the Lamb, having every one of them harps, and golden vials full of odours, which are the prayers of the saints." The Rheims note says, "Here we see that the saints in Heaven offer to Christ the prayers of the faithful on earth." Of this passage, Cardinal Cajetan says—"Let him that can expound it"—"exponat qui potest." We are not now going to determine as to what these "living creatures" and elders represent. That they denote the spirits of departed saints is by no means clear; nor can we for a moment suppose it. Evidently, the whole passage is symbolical, being a narrative of a vision, and not a plain account of things as they are. St. Jerome states the opinion that these four-and-twenty elders mean the four-and-twenty books of the Old Testament, which he enumerates. St. Augustine says, that the four living creatures signify the four evangelists, and in his work *De Consensu Evangelistarum*, he has devoted a chapter (lib. i. cap. 6) to the consideration of the manner in which the four living creatures represented the four evangelists, quotes the opinions of others who went before him, and condemns some of them. But whatever be the meaning of this passage, which at best is but dark and mysterious, it certainly does not prove that dead men or angels hear or pray for us.

Apoc. vi. 9, 10, is also quoted, where the souls of them that were slain for the Word of God are represented as reposing under the divine altar, and crying, with a loud voice: "How long, O Lord, dost thou not avenge our blood on them that dwell on the earth?" This may be regarded merely as a question or inquiry on the

part of those souls; we do not, however, conceive such to be the meaning of the passage; for in asking a question, "crying with a loud voice" is not becoming, and must be out of place. The true meaning, doubtless, is, that the souls of the martyrs, untimely slain for the truths of Christ, are in heaven as a testimony against the cruelty and wickedness of those persecutors by whom they were cut off from the earth. In a similar way, God said to Cain, "The voice of thy brother's blood crieth unto Me from the ground."—Gen. iv., 10. Not that the blood of Abel, or the souls of the martyrs, did ever actually cry with a real voice, or really pray to God; but that they were memorials, as it were, of crime, and in the sight of the Divine Justice demanded vengeance against the criminals. This is not praying for men, but *against* them; nor is it praying for each individually, as the Council of Trent speaks.

There appears, then, nothing in God's word to authorize us in supposing that departed saints pray for their militant brethren on earth. On the authority of that word, we cannot affirm that they do, or that they do not. If they do, doubtless we should have been informed on the subject; so that the silence of Scripture is a sufficient reason for our rejecting the notion of their intercession, and the practice of invoking them, which depends upon it. We must not expect to find in Holy Writ passages condemnatory of every error which men may invent; it is enough in any case that the Bible does not teach such, and the fact of its silence on any doctrine of religion is to Christians a sufficient warranty for repudiating it.

From what we have said, it appears that there is no Scripture proof whatever that saints, after their departure from this world, know anything about its affairs—much less about the prayers or necessities of individuals; no proof that they can or do pray at all in their disembodied state—much less that they pray for men, and "for each individually;" and, consequently, nothing to justify the Romish practice of invoking their prayers. On the contrary, there is much against the supposition that they are cognisant of the transactions of this world, or take any part therein by their intercession or otherwise. A few points yet remain to be considered, which we hope to proceed with in our next number.

THE DUMB VILLAGE.

CHAP. VI.

THE new priest's sun had set, and Tom Connell's rose upon its decline. The news of his discussion was soon blazed abroad, with divers marvellous embellishments. And as Tom was neither changed into a rat or a hare, the most incredulous of the villagers looked upon this as decisive evidence that he had the best of it. His "six foot length" as he strode along, the admired of all beholders, was confirmation strong that the priest's ecclesiastical powers were as weak as his argumentative. That Tom became a Protestant proved the last—so they thought. That he continued a living man, unmetamorphosed, hale and hearty as ever, settled the former, at least in the estimation of those whose most practical ground of assurance in the truth of their religion arose from a belief in the miraculous powers of its priesthood.

"How was it, Tom? Tell us all about it, man!" met our friend on all sides. For many an evening hour, and round many a turf fire, groups of anxious hearers forced him to fight his battle o'er and o'er. Thus Tom found multiplied and favourable opportunities of pressing upon his absorbed auditors the difficulties which had staggered him in his former faith, and determined its change. Thus, too, he found many occasions, which he used with great advantage, of setting before them, with the attraction of his natural eloquence, and force of his determined character, the power of the truth which had emancipated him.

The rector of the parish soon saw how matters were going on, and with that skill which characterised him, of seizing on available occasions, he decided on keeping for a time the Scripture-readers aloof from all interference, lest they might, in any way, distract or disturb the strong current of feeling produced by the issue of Tom's discussion, and continued by his subsequent activity. Not to mar by unnecessary meddling was a fixed rule of action with this sagacious man. He knew full well that discretion was sometimes shown as much by withholding as, at other times, in pressing efforts. And, therefore, he now resolved on a temporary discontinuance of all other agency, so long as so many of the villagers should continue to be busily engaged in discussing the recent event. Accordingly, having communicated his views to Tom Connell, he said to him, "I shall keep the Scripture-readers a little in the background while I find the people anxious to hear all you have to say. Now they are greedily listening to you. We must endeavour to turn to good account the opportunity which it has pleased God to give us. I wish you, then, especially to try and bring before their minds that their religion has interposed between them and God a multitude of barriers which his own word never sanctions. Press upon them, that while professing to hold the great truths of the Bible, these it neutralises in practice, and corrupts by additions. Let God's word speak for itself to them. Strive to show them that the difficulties to understanding it, and the dangers in reading it, of which they hear so much, are the fictions of men, introduced for the purpose of magnifying the Romish priesthood in their eyes, and preventing the detection of Romish errors. Your friend Williams quite agrees with me in thinking it will be

^a St. August. in Apoc. iv., 6. Hom. iii. tom. iii. pt. ii. App. p. 164. Ben. ed.

^c Tom. iii. p. 2, p. 6.